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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD BUREAU
OF AVIATION SAFETY
By B. R. ALLENt
I. INTRODUCTIONS AFETY IN FLIGHT has been a concern of many people reaching back
for many, many years. In fact, the first mention of an airman fatality
and the first probable cause of an aviation accident appears in Greek My-
thology. You probably will recall that Daedalus, who was an architect,
carpenter, and inventor had incurred the wrath of the King of Crete and
had been imprisoned. In order to escape, he fashioned a pair of wings of
feathers and wax for himself and his son Icarus. Together they attempted
a flight to Sicily. En route, however, Icarus' wings failed, and he fell into
the Icarian Sea. The story does not tell us who the investigators were, but
I am sure they must have felt some of the same frustration we do when the
hardware we need to examine is under hundreds of feet of water. Not-
withstanding this handicap, the officials apparently completed their inves-
tigation and concluded that this was a pilot error accident, precipitated
when Icarus flew too close to the sun, thus causing the wax bonding of his
wings to melt. The pilot error conclusion was influenced no doubt by the
fact that Daedalus made it safely to Sicily, where he lived a long life and
built many temples. Presumably, Icarus could have made it to Sicily also
if he had not attempted to set an altitude record on the way.
I am quite sure that if the National Transportation Safety Board had
investigated that accident it would not have so easily concluded that the
probable cause was pilot error. I believe that we might have made some
comments on the suitability of wax as a bonding material, or at least rec-
ommended accident prevention measures such as provision for maximum
operating altitudes or minimum distances from the sun when wax was used
as a structural fastener. Whatever the true circumstances may have been,
the story of Icarus is ancient, but the history of the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board is in a way just beginning, and I would like to take a
moment to identify the Board, or the NTSB as it is sometimes called, be-
fore discussing our accident investigation and accident prevention pro-
cedures.
II. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
The National Transportation Safety Board was created by the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act and began operations officially in April of
1967. While the Board is established within the framework of the Depart-
ment of Transportation for certain administrative and support purposes,
" Director, Bureau of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board, Department of
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the Act specifically provides that it shall be independent of the Secretary
and other officers or offices of the Department of Transportation in the
exercise of its powers and duties. In fact, accident investigation decisions
the Board makes are not reviewable, and its certificate appeals decisions
are reviewable only by the courts.
Under the provisions of the Department of Transportation Act, the
National Transportation Safety Board is charged with responsibility for
the investigation and probable cause determination of transportation acci-
dents. Its safety activities thus extend into civil aviation, marine, railroad,
highway and pipeline modes of transportation. In the course of these activ-
ities the Board's primary objective is accident prevention. In fact, a re-
view of the legislative history of the Department of Transportation Act of
1966 shows this to be a mandate from Congress. Accident investigation,
special studies, and statistical analyses are the principal tools used in achiev-
ing this objective.
Under the Act of 1966, the Bureau of Safety of the Civil Aeronautics
Board was transferred intact to the National Transportation Safety Board
and became its Bureau of Aviation Safety. The duties and functions were
not changed in the transfer, and it is this Bureau that is responsible for the
conduct of investigations of accidents involving civil aircraft in the United
States. To carry out its duties the Bureau maintains a Washington head-
quarters, and eleven field offices strategically located throughout the United
States. The Bureau has a total complement of 184 employes comprised of
52 field investigators, 55 Washington-based investigators, and 77 technical
specialist, administrative, and clerical personnel. The investigation staff
contains specialists in such diverse fields as meteorology, metallurgy, air-
craft systems and structures, powerplants, electronics, aircraft maintenance,
piloting and air traffic control.
III. THE INVESTIGATION BY THE BOARD
Investigations conducted by the Bureau follow much the same manage-
ment pattern whether the investigation involves a small general aviation
accident and is conducted by a field office investigator or whether a cata-
strophic air carrier accident investigation is being conducted by a Washing-
ton headquarters team. The principal difference lies only in the complexity
of the investigation and the number of the participating parties involved.
It should be noted here that the purpose of the Board's investigation is to
determine probable cause of the accident, not to assess liability. To coin a
phrase, we investigate airworthiness, not blameworthiness. Further, we do
not investigate accidents simply in order to remove the mystery surround-
ing the crash or to satisfy public curiosity; it is the fulfillment of a public
service under the mandates of Congress. The purpose of our investigation
is to obtain all relevant knowledge so that appropriate corrective measures
may be taken to prevent similar accidents in the future. Accurate cause
determination is the major contribution in this endeavor. When the Board
finds safety problems warranting further attention by the FAA, other gov-
ernment agencies or industry, recommendations are formulated. These
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recommendations become a matter of public record under the provisions
of Section 5 (e) of the Department of Transportation Act.
In the investigation of a major air carrier accident, we use a manage-
ment procedure identified as the "team" concept or specialty group sys-
tem. Under this plan there are four Washington-based supervisory air
safety investigators who are assigned as investigator-in-charge on a rotat-
ing basis. On Friday of each week a "go-team" is established on a standby
basis for instant dispatch to the scene of an accident. This team is com-
posed of the investigator-in-charge, two assistant investigators-in-charge,
one for airworthiness and one for operations, and a number of specialists
assigned as chairmen of the various technical groups. Members of the Board
take assignments in rotation so that when the team is activated a Board
member is on call to accompany the team to the accident site. When no-
tification of an accident is received by the Board's duty officer, the assigned
team is alerted and a determination to dispatch it is made based on the con-
ditions and circumstances surrounding the accident.
During the same period appropriate FAA personnel are being notified
through FAA channels. Members of industry groups who will participate
in the investigation are being alerted by their respective organizations. In
addition to the FAA, participating parties normally include the following:
airframe manufacturer, powerplant manufacturer, equipment manufac-
turer, the airline operator involved, the Air Line Pilots Association or the
Allied Pilots Association, the Flight Engineers International Association,
the International Association of Machinists, and the Air Line Dispatchers
Association. Additionally, other organizations often participate, depending
on the nature and circumstances of the accident or the equipment involved.
Examples are: (1) one or more of the military services in such cases as a
mid-air collision with a military aircraft or if they operate similar equip-
ment, (2) the United States Weather Bureau, (3) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, (4) the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, (5) the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, and (6) representatives of a
foreign government, under ICAO agreements, if an aircraft of foreign reg-
istry or foreign manufacture is involved.
Industry participation is not for the purpose of conferring special priv-
ilege on any person or company, but it is to provide the Board with tech-
nical knowledge or specialized skills that might be otherwise unobtainable.
Additionally, the Board sees an outstanding advantage in permitting these
parties to participate. Participation provides an opportunity for a rapid
and natural flow of information to the participating organization's super-
visory personnel. This can lead to early, coordinated, corrective action in
many areas of design, manufacture and operation of the aircraft and its
components. Many such actions are outside the sphere of causal factors but,
nevertheless, enhance future safety of operation.
The first order of business upon arrival on scene is an organizational
meeting of the Safety Board's investigators and interested party personnel.
Emphasis is placed on locating the flight recorder and cockpit voice re-
corder. Each of the interested parties has a coordinator assigned to the in-
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vestigation. The coordinator is the senior participant for his organization
and acts as liaison between the investigation and his parent organization.
Each coordinator provides personnel from his organization for assignment
by the investigator-in-charge to one or more of the specialty groups in
which his organization may be able to provide a high degree of expertise.
The chairman of each group is an NTSB investigator who is a specialist in
a particular technical area to be covered during the course of the investiga-
tion. The number of groups established depends to some extent on the na-
ture of the accident. In general, however, groups would be established for
each of the following specialized areas of investigation:
(1) aircraft structures,
(2) powerplants (and propellers as appropriate),
(3) systems,
(4) maintenance records,
(5) aircraft and company operations procedures,
(6) air traffic control,
(7) weather,
(8) witnesses,
(9) human factors, and
(10) flight data recorder.
The names of these groups very nearly identify their area of activity;
therefore, I will not attempt to spell out their responsibilities at this time.
Rather, I would like to give you a few illustrations of how each group,
at one time or another through the years, has provided the principal facts
upon which the probable cause of the accident could be established.
On 6 January 1960, a DC-6B crashed near Bolivia, North Carolina.
While most of the wreckage was found near Bolivia, a sizable portion of
the fuselage and the body of a passenger were located 16 miles away. Upon
initial examination by the structures group it was obvious that structural
separation had occurred in flight. A three dimensional reconstruction of
the fuselage and center wing area was made to facilitate the group in its
work of piecing together evidence to show how structural separation oc-
curred and where it originated. In examination of the wreckage several of
the following possibilities were considered: metal fatigue failure and ex-
plosive decompression; propeller blade failure and cabin penetration; mal-
function of the cabin pressure system; lightning strike; fuel vapor explo-
sion; oxygen bottle explosion; and the possibility of detonation of a high
energy explosive within the cabin.
The three dimensional mock up disposed of all possibilities but that of
the presence of a high energy explosive. In the examination of the pieces
of wreckage sodium carbonate, sodium nitrate, and complex mixtures of
sodium sulphur compounds were found in the passenger cabin air vents.
This residue is characteristic of a dynamite explosion. Nitrates were also
found on material ejected from the cabin and located 16 miles from the
main wreckage. In this instance the structures group assisted by the human
factors group was not only able to prove the cause of the structural dam-
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age but to identify the exact place in the aircraft that the explosive was
set off.
In an accident near Chase, Maryland, in 1959, the weather group was
able to identify the probability of extreme turbulence in a clear area ahead
of a thunderstorm and at the altitude at which the aircraft was operating.
This turbulence led to a loss of control and subsequent inflight breakup of
the aircraft.The human factors group in this instance, through autopsies
detailing injuries to the passengers, provided information that confirmed
the presence of the extreme turbulence. Extreme turbulence associated
with thunderstorm activity was again identified as having been involved
in the more recent accident at Falls City, Nebraska, on 7 August 1966.
Incidentally, the accepted definition of extreme turbulence is "a rarely en-
countered turbulence condition in which the aircraft is violently tossed
about and is practically impossible to control. It may cause structural
damage."
In the accident involving an F-27 at San Ramon, California, on 7 May
1964, analysis of the air traffic control communications tapes by the ATC
identified the fact that the crew had been shot while the aircraft was en
route to San Francisco. The more recent crash of the DC-8 at New Orleans
on 30 March 1967, was solved in great part by the information derived
from the flight data recorder and correlated data from the cockpit voice
recorder. These are but a few examples of the many instances in which the
final phase of an investigation centers around an area of specific investiga-
tive activity.
On rare occasions it may develop that special groups need to be: formed;
these are handled on an ad hoc basis. These special groups have been insti-
tuted to examine such areas as manufacturing processes, overhaul facilities
and aerodynamics.
One very essential key element to accident investigation is flexibility.
Many varied factors influence the course of an investigation, e.g., terrain,
weather, type of accident (in-flight failure, fire, explosion), and type and
complexity of the aircraft and its component parts. There can be no hard
and fast rules governing how many groups, numbers of investigators, or
the extent of investigation within the groups. Oftentimes during the rela-
tively early stages of an investigation, it is possible to channel the major
on-going efforts in particular directions. For example, if the accident in-
volved is a mid-air collision, it is usually possible after a limited amount of
investigation to eliminate the powerplants as a causal factor; therefore we
do not engage in a detailed disassembly of the engines. The advent of the
flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder have played a major role in
facilitating the effective channeling of investigative efforts with a resultant
saving in manpower and money. As the foregoing suggests, many groups
arrive at a negative finding, i.e., nothing abnormal or unusual was disclosed
by their particular part of the investigation. By obversion, this becomes
positive information in that by process of elimination the area of probable
cause becomes isolated and is brought into sharp focus.
While the Board's procedures for an investigation are well established,
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the success of our operations are often associated with innovation. The very
nature of our work places a premium on individual initiative and imagina-
tion. For example, in the accident involving the Lockheed Electra that
crashed into the bay at Boston in 1960, it became necessary to determine if
power was being produced on a particular engine. We knew that the engine
in question was the source of energy for certain electronic equipment
aboard the aircraft. Consequently, a rather unique test was employed using
vacuum tubes identical to those contained in the accident-involved elec-
tronic component being examined. The vacuum tubes were heated to op-
erating temperature and immersed in water elevated to a temperature of
570, the same temperature as that of the accident site in Winthrop Bay at
Boston. The vacuum tubes in the accident aircraft had cracked or crazed
in a specific manner whereas the unheated tubes did not display the same
pattern. This test provided further confirmation of the fact that the engine
in question had in fact been developing power and that the electronic
equipment in question had been in operation at the time of impact.
In other circumstances, we have been comparatively successful in using
the cockpit voice recorder tapes to determine such things as aircraft speed
and in one instance the overspeed condition of a propeller just prior to its
failure. This has been accomplished by analyzing the frequency and ampli-
tudes of the noise recorded on the CVR. While this device was conceived
and designed originally to provide a record of crew conversations, it has
proved immeasurably valuable in other instances similar to those just de-
scribed.
During many accident investigations, laboratory studies of failed com-
ponents or materials associated with the aircraft are required to obtain in-
formation related to the cause of the accident. The Board maintains a small
metallurgical laboratory in Washington for the purpose of making such
studies. This laboratory conducts our routine metallurgical investigations,
but it does not have the facilities for many of the specialized studies re-
quired. Work such as the examination of fractures with electron micro-
scope, spectographic identification or analysis of materials, the determina-
tion of the extent of deterioration of non-metallic materials, and more ex-
tended research or testing programs is done for the Board in other govern-
ment or industry laboratories. The National Bureau of Standards, the FBI,
the Naval Research Laboratory, and many aviation industry laboratories
conduct special studies for the Board. In all cases, however, when com-
ponents are retained by the Board for laboratory study, the custody of
the parts is controlled by the Board until they are returned to the owner
after the Board's investigation is completed.
In order to expedite corrective action it is the general practice of the
Board to cooperate as much as possible with manufacturers who desire to
make their own laboratory investigation of failed components. For this
reason one half of a broken part is frequently sent to the manufacturer
and the other half retained by the Board for laboratory study. Keep in
mind that the mated surfaces of a failed part are mirror images, and either
surface will tell the identical story.
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In many cases evidence may be destroyed during the course of the lab-
oratory investigations. Parts frequently must be cut through a fracture or-
igin, for example, to determine the cause of failure. However, the evidence
is always documented to the ultimate extent possible by photography or
other means.
The factual information that the Board develops is recorded and made
into a public record. When a public hearing is not held, this record is com-
posed of the factual reports of the investigator-in-charge and those of any
specialty group chairman who may participate in the investigation. Em-
bodied in these reports or contained in the accident file as separate but re-
lated factual information will be witness statements, transcripts of air
traffic control communications, the results of any special tests or metal-
lurgical examination, photographs, and other pertinent material. All of
this information is available to the public in two ways. The record may be
reviewed in person in the Board's Washington headquarters or it will be
reproduced and mailed on request for a fee, the amount of which is based
mainly upon the number of printed pages and photographs copied
IV. THE HEARING
When a catastrophic air carrier accident occurs a public hearing is usual-
ly held. A recent trend is to hold these hearings in Washington. Hearings
are fact finding in nature and are not adversary proceedings. Therefore,
procedural rules preclude participation of representatives of litigation in-
terests. Hearings are conducted by a board of inquiry which is normally
composed of a Board member, a representative of the director's office of
the Bureau of Aviation Safety, the hearing officer assigned to the investi-
gation, and a representative of the Board's general counsel. A technical
panel is also formed consisting of the investigator-in-charge and those
group chairmen necessary to fulfill objectives of the hearing. Primary ques-
tioning of witnesses is by the technical panel and the board of inquiry.
The parties to the investigation are permitted additional questioning of
witnesses, but cross-examination in the legal sense is not allowed. Litiga-
tion attorneys may attend these inquiries as members of the public, but
they may not participate in the proceedings in any way. The factual re-
ports, together with photographs, charts, drawings, witness statements,
laboratory reports and other documentary products of the investigation are
introduced into evidnce. All questioning and testimony is recorded and
becomes a part of the public docket.
The entire factual record, including all exhibits entered, and the tran-
script of the testimony taken during a hearing is available to the public in
the same manner as previously mentioned. In addition, the transcript of the
testimony at a public hearing is available from the recording service con-
tractor to anyone who wishes to purchase it. Purchase arrangements can
'Copies of material ordered are mailed and billed direct by Graphic Craftsmen, Inc., a Wash-
ington business firm holding the current contract for commercial reproduction of the Board's pub-
lic files. Charges average 15 cents a page for photostatic copies of documents and 90 cents a page
for pictures, plus postage ($1 minimum). Orders for this material will also involve a $2 user
service charge by the Board. This is in addition to the cost of commercial reproduction of material.
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be made from the recorder at the time of the hearing, or the transcript
can be ordered from the recording company at the established fee. The
Board publishes the results of its investigations in the following two forms:
Aircraft Accident Reports (long form) and Briefs of Accidents (short
form). Aircraft Accident Reports are detailed, individual reports of the
facts, circumstances, and probable cause of major aircraft accidents usually
those involving a public hearing. Briefs of Accidents contains the reports
of United States civil aircraft accidents in an abbreviated format. It is
published monthly and provides identifying facts, probable cause and re-
lated factors as well as summary statistical data. In addition, the National
Transportation Safety Board publishes the results of special studies in re-
ports such as Aircraft Design Induced Pilot Error, The Phenomenon of
Aircraft Aquaplaning, and Metal Fatigue and Its Recognition.
All of these reports as well as a wealth of related aircraft accident sta-
tistical information is available to the public. Some documents are free; for
others there is a nominal charge. I will not take the time to detail them all
here, but a list of all publications of the Board containing a description of
the material and its cost is available.
V. ACCIDENT PREVENTION
Fundamentally, what we have discussed up to this point is the present
state of the art of aircraft accident investigation. These procedures have
been for the most part an empirical development over the years that in a
very real sense represent after-the-fact accident prevention. As successful
as this approach to safety has been, the National Transportation Safety
Board believes that the larger mandate given to it by Congress is the pre-
vention of accidents before-the-fact. In this regard, it is interesting to note
that in every legislative act from the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which
created the old Air Safety Board, through the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, which created the Federal Aviation Agency, and into the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act, which created the National Transportation
Safety Board, there has been nearly identical language requiring the suc-
cessive safety agencies to ascertain what will best tend to reduce or elimi-
nate the possibility of accidents by conducting special studies on matters
pertaining to safety and the prevention of accidents.
We are presently taking steps to more effectively discharge our respon-
sibilities and duties in this most important activity. One major step in this
direction is the very recent reorganization of our Bureau of Aviation Safe-
ty and the establishment of an Accident Prevention Branch. This Branch
is responsible for developing and executing accident prevention programs
that will include such diverse activities as human engineering studies rela-
tive to structural design interactions with human performance capabilities,
the computer processing of accident reports, and statistical trend analyses.
We belic.ve that statistical analyses made in a manner similar to the Safe-
ty Board's recently released Aircraft Design Induced Pilot Error study
(ADIPE as it has become more commonly known) can be very effective in
accident prevention. I am sure that all of you are familiar with the seg-
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mented pie graphical display that has been prepared by the Bureau for
many years. We think that the most interesting aspect of these pictorial
presentations is that the percentage figures ascribed to the various causal
factors such as pilot error, mechanical deficiencies, or inadequate mainte-
nance have changed but little through the years. What these: figures tell
us is that we have known for a long time what was happening and that no
dramatic reduction in the accident and fatality rates has occurred. We are
now of the opinion that a bulk look at all of the accidents in each section
of our statistical pie, in the manner of the ADIPE study, will be very pro-
ductive of accident prevention measures and will assist us materially in
the anticipation and recognition of potentially dangerous situations and the
root cause of accidents.
The computer is, of course, the key to studies of this nature. We intend
to exploit its memory and data retrieval capabilities to the maximum extent
possible, not only in after-the-fact learning from past history but in safe-
ty projections for the future. These projections will in part be derived
from trend analysis and from studies of incidents which in themselves have
not caused an accident but which contain elements that unless corrected
could lead to an accident in the future. This is not to say that we will be
able to eliminate all after-the-fact investigations since it is unlikely that
we will be able to anticipate every new or uniquely hazardous situation.
However, as the civil aircraft fleet continues to grow it will be necessary
for the Board to concentrate its accident investigative efforts to those areas
capable of producing the maximum accident prevention and safety pro-
motion material. As a result, we can foresee the day when the Board of
necessity will reduce or even eliminate its direct participation in the inves-
tigation of certain types of aircraft accidents which, however interesting
they may be from a civil litigation standpoint, nevertheless produce little
information of value in the saving of human life. Typical of the accidents
in this classification are those in which the pilot inadvertently retracts the
landing gear instead of the flaps while taxiing to the terminal or the in-
stance in which a helicopter makes a hard contact with the ground during
a practice auto-rotation landing. A desk audit type investigation of such
accidents could satisfy any requirement with respect to airworthiness cer-
tification of the aircraft, proper maintenance, or crew competence. At the
same time the Board would have provided to it the statistical data necessary
for the "bulk look" previously mentioned.
In practice the policy of limiting our investigations to those accidents
most productive of accident prevention information has already been ex-
pressed in the National Transportation Safety Board's Rules Pertaining to
Aircraft Accidents, Incidents, Overdue Aircraft and Safety Investigations.
These rules exclude from the definition of aircraft accident such things
as damage limited to an engine and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires,
brakes, flaps, or wing tips. As time and circumstances dictate it may be-
come necessary for the Board to include other occurrences in this list of
excluded events in order to better channel its resources and manpower to
more productive pursuits.
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In closing, we believe that as important as aircraft accident prevention
may have been in the past, it can only become more important in the near
future as will our role in accident investigation on a selective basis to pro-
vide a sound effective accident prevention actions. We are about to inject
into the air carrier inventory aircraft costing in excess of $20 million and
capable of carrying nearly 500 people. An accident involving such an air-
craft might well assume catastrophic proportions dwarfing, by comparison,
previous aviation tragedies. Every effort is being expended by both govern-
ment and industry today to minimize the likelihood of such a tragedy. We
in the Board are endeavoring to define and apply the lessons learned from
accident investigations and special safety studies using to the extent pos-
sible electronic computers to identify those subtle and elusive common
denominators in accident causation. In this increasingly important task, we
welcome the on-going cooperative efforts of all concerned in the aviation
community.
